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COMMENTS
COMPUTER PRINTOUTS AS EVIDENCE: STRICTER
FOUNDATION OR PRESUMPTION OF
RELIABILITY?
I. INTRODUCTION
Computer-generated evidence is an increasingly important resource in
today's court room. Much evidence that was once created manually is now
created by computer.I Given this fact, the issue facing courts is whether the
legal system is in need of new rules of evidence or stricter foundation re-
quirements to deal adequately with computer-generated evidence.2 Some
courts and commentators maintain that although computer-generated
records have an aura of reliability, they are actually more unreliable and
inaccurate than traditional forms of evidence. Therefore, the argument
goes, the legal system needs new rules of evidence or stricter foundation
requirements to deal with computer printouts.' Others contend, however,
1. Computer use in the courtroom has grown explosively in the last three decades. See Peter
M. Storm, Comment, Admitting Computer Generated Records: A Presumption of Reliability, 18 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 115, 115-16 (1984).
2. Id. at 116-17; see generally MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, SECOND §§ 21.446,
33.12, 33.53 (1985) [hereinafter MANUAL, SECOND]; MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE
§ 314 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984) [hereinafter MCCORMICK]; 4, 5 JACK B. WEINSTEIN &
MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE %% 803(6)[05], 803(8)[04], 901(b)(9)[02],
1001(3)[4], 1001(4)[07] (1990) [hereinafter WEINSTEIN]; Edmund M. Connery & Sidney B. Levy,
Computer Evidence in Federal Courts, 84 CoM. L.J. (1979); Roy N. Freed, Mock Trial, Admissi-
bility of Computerized Business Records, 15 JURIMETRICS J. 206 (1975); Ronald L. Johnston, A
Guide for the Proponent and Opponent of Computer-Based Evidence, 1 COMPUTER/L.J. 667 (1978-
79); Rudolph J. Peritz, Computer Data and Reliability: A Call for Authentication of Business
Records Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 956 (1986); Paula Noyes Singer,
Proposed Changes to the Federal Rules of Evidence as Applied to Comptiter-Generated Evidence, 7
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 157 (1979); James A. Sprowl, Evaluating the Credibility of
Computer-Generated Evidence, 52 CHi.-KENT L. REv. 547 (1976); Colin Tapper, Evidence from
Computers, 8 GA. L. REv. 562 (1974); Note, Appropriate Foundation Requirements for Admitting
Computer Printouts into Evidence, 1977 WASH. U. L.Q. 59 [hereinafter Note, Appropriate Founda-
tion]; Comment, A Reconsideration of the Admissibility of Computer-Generated Evidence, 126 U.
PA. L. REv. 425 (1977); Randy Snyder, Note, Assuring the Competency of Computer Generated
Evidence, 9 COMPUTER/L.J. 103 (1989) [hereinafter Note, Competency]; Peter M. Storm, Com-
ment, Admitting Computer-Generated Records: A Presumption of Reliability, 18 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 115 (1984) [hereinafter Comment, Presumption of Reliability].
3. See generally Peritz, supra note 2; Singer, supra note 2.
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that because computer technology has advanced so substantially, computer-
generated records should enjoy a presumption of reliability.4
This Comment begins by analyzing the relationship between computer-
generated evidence and the trustworthiness and accuracy of that evidence.
Next, arguments for and against stricter foundation requirements for com-
puter printouts are summarized. The application of the Federal Rules of
Evidence to computer printouts is then explored.' Although computer-gen-
erated evidence raises issues under many of the Federal Rules,6 this Com-
ment focuses on the rules regarding authentication,7 the hearsay exceptions
for records of regularly conducted activities' and their absence,9 the hearsay
exceptions for public records"0 and their absence,11 and the rule regarding
4. See generally Comment, Presumption of Reliability, supra note 2.
5. See FED. R. EVID. 102.
6. For a discussion of the admission of computer-generated evidence through an expert, see
United States v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 64, 69 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v. Bastanipour, 697 F.2d
170, 176-77 (7th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 460 U.S. 1091 (1983); Perma Research & Dev. v. Singer
Co., 542 F.2d 111, 115 (2d Cir. 1976), cert denied, 429 U.S. 987 (1976); In Re Paternity of T.L.S.,
125 Wis. 2d 399, 403-04, 373 N.W.2d 55 (Ct. App. 1985); Robert R. Henak & Ellen Henak, Using
Computer Printouts in the Courtroom, Wis. LAWYER, Mar. 1989, at 10. For a discussion of the
best evidence rule and computer-generated evidence, see King v. State ex rel Murdock Acceptance
Corp., 222 So. 2d 393 (Miss. 1969) (printouts are best evidence because records stored on tape
would be "unavailable and useless"); Transport Indem. Co. v. Seib, 132 N.W.2d 871 (Neb. 1965)
(computer printouts are originals); MANUAL, SECOND, supra note 2, § 21.446, at 61 n.80 (a
printout made especially for trial is an original under Rule 1001(3)); WEINSTEIN, supra note 2
1001(3)[04], at 1001-60; Comment, Presumption of Reliability, supra, note 2, at 125-29. For a
discussion suggesting treating printouts under a new best evidence rule, see Singer, supra note 2, at
184-92 (arguing for modifying Rules 1001(3) and 1001(4)). For a discussion of the use of private
computerized records, see Sabatino v. Curtiss Nat'l. Bank, 415 F.2d 632 (5th Cir. 1969), cert
denied, 396 U.S. 1059 (1970); Comment, Presumption of Reliability, supra note 2, at 140-43; Note,
Competency, supra note 2, at 113-14. For a discussion of the admission of printouts through the
use of a photocopy statute, e.g. 28 U.S.C. § 1732, in connection with the records of regularly
conducted activity exception to the hearsay rule, see BENDER, COMPUTER LAW, SOFrWARE
PROTECTION § 6.04, at 6-19 (1990). For a discussion of the use of computer-generated simula-
tions, models, and projections, see Note, Competency, supra note 2, at 114-20. For a discussion of
printouts as admissions of a party opponent, see BENDER, supra § 6.08, at 6-201. For a discussion
of whether the use of a computer program to calculate maintenance and support in a divorce
action constitutes the use of evidence not before the court, see Bisone v. Bisone, 165 Wis. 2d 114,
477 N.W.2d 59 (Ct. App. 1991).
7. FED. R. EvID. 901, 902.
8. FED. R. EVID. 803(6). This hearsay exception is sometimes called the "business records
exception."
9. FED. R. EvID. 803(7).
10. FED. R. EVID. 803(8).
11. FED. R. EVID. 803(10).
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summaries." Decisions made under the common law, state statutes, or pre-Federal Rules statutes are discussed when appropriate. 3
II. COMPUTER SYSTEMS' RELATIONSHIP TO EVIDENTIARY ISSUES
A. Overview of Computer Systems
Computer systems used by different business and government entities
differ enormously in their makeup. The component parts of a computer
system influence the reliability of that system and the accuracy and trust-
worthiness of the system's output. Although a detailed description of com-
puters and data processing is beyond the scope of this Comment, an
understanding of basic information systems principles assists in analyzing
the evidentiary issues presented by computer-generated evidence. 4
While some aspects of computer processing have changed over the years
and the speed at which computers perform instructions and access data has
increased, the basic principles of computing have remained the same. 5 A
computer system consists of hardware and software.16 The hardware is the
physical components of the computer system.17
Computer software can be divided into two categories: systems
software and applications software.1" The former, sometimes referred to as
the operating system, consists of the programs that direct the computer's
12. FED. R. EVID. 1006.
13. Many states have evidence codes based wholly or substantially on the Federal Rules.
GRAHAM C. LILY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE XXV (2d ed. 1987).
14. For a discussion of the basic concepts, and examples of basic data processing systems, see
BENDER, supra note 6, § 6.02(2), at 226-27 (example of update of customer master account);
Singer, supra note 2, at 159-62 (example of calculation of salesmen's commission); Note, Appropri-
ate Foundation, supra note 2, at 73-78.
15. Computers can be categorized according to size as mainframe, mini, and personal. A
large manufacturing corporation may own or lease one or more large mainframe computers man-
ufactured by companies such as IBM or Amdahl for corporate wide database and file processing
such as payroll, benefits, and order entry. The same corporation may own or lease several mini
computers manufactured by companies like IBM or Digital Equipment Corporation to process
inventory transactions at each of its manufacturing plants. The corporation may own or lease
hundreds of personal computers made by different manufacturers to perform word processing and
other functions. The corporation may upload information from the minis and personal computers
to the mainframe on a regular schedule, via a telecommunications network, and may similarly
download information from the mainframe to the minis and personal computers. See generally
Connery & Levy, supra note 2, at 266.
16. Id.
17. A typical system's hardware consists of the central processing unit, terminals, disk drives,
printers, tape readers, and other peripheral units. Singer, supra note 2, at 159.
18. Connery & Levy, supra note 2, at 266; see also David Bender, Computer Programs and
Proposed Revisions of the Patent and Copyright Laws, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 241 (1968); Note, Com-
puter Programs, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1541 (1968).
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hardware.1 9 Applications software consists of programs that perform a
business function or solve problems."0 Applications programs are sets of
instructions that are written in a programming language.2 ' A programmer
may write applications software to be sold prepackaged by a software ven-
dor22 or a programmer may write an applications program for a specific
customer or employer.
Evidence generated by a computer can include computer programs, 23
the operations log, 4 disk or tape files in machine-readable form,2 and com-
puter printouts.26 This Comment focuses on printouts. The applications of
computers are endless, and thus, so too are the types of printouts that may
be offered as evidence. Printouts of hospital records, bank records, tele-
phone records, inventory records, Internal Revenue Service records, and
Drug Enforcement Agency records are only a few examples of the types of
computer-generated documents that may be offered as evidence.
B. Factors Which Influence the Trustworthiness and Accuracy of
Computer Printouts
Computers generate records using processes that introduce factors dif-
ferent from those that have traditionally influenced the trustworthiness and
accuracy of evidence.2 7
[C]omputer data acquires reliability as evidence from the system
under which it is produced. If the original data fed in is not accurate
or if the machine and its program are not well designed and operated
or if the data produced is not properly evaluated, it has no probative
force.28
19. For example, the operating system may direct the computer to read a disk file and to load
an applications software program into memory for execution. See Connery & Levy, supra note 2,
at 266.
20. In a business setting, applications software might perform payroll, order entry, financial,
and other functions. Id.
21. Once written, an applications programmer must transform the applications program into
machine language before executing the program. Id at 267.
22. Peritz, supra note 2, at 992.
23. See United States v. Bonallo, 858 F.2d 1427 (9th Cir. 1988) (admission of a program that
allowed one person to withdraw cash from a bank but withdrew the sum from another person's
account); BENDER, supra note 6, § 6.02(4), at 6-13.
24. BENDER, supra note 6, § 6.02(3), at 6-12 (e.g., to prove that a program was run at a
certain time on a certain day).
25. Bender, supra note 6, § 6.02(1), at 6-8.
26. Id. For the purposes of this Comment, the term computer printout denotes a system's
report or output, usually produced on a printer attached to the system.
27. Note, Competency, supra note 2, at 105.
28. WEINSTEIN, supra note 2, 901(b)(9)[02], at 901-1113.
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The trustworthiness of computer printouts and the accuracy of the out-
put of computer systems is often questioned when parties attempt to au-
thenticate or lay the foundation for computer-generated records of regular
conducted activity, computer-generated public records, and computer-gen-
erated summaries. Both the trustworthiness and accuracy of computer
printouts depend upon the trustworthiness and accuracy of a computer sys-
tem's hardware, software, data entry procedures,29 applications controls,30
and system security.31
Computer hardware has a reputation for reliability;32 it is rarely a con-
tributing factor to errors in computer-generated evidence. 3 In King v.
State ex rel. Murdoch Acceptance Corp., the court stated: "[T]he scientific
reliability of such machines, electronic computing equipment, in the light of
their general use and the general reliance of the business world on them can
scarcely be questioned. 35
Software, however, does not enjoy the same reputation for reliability.
Some commentators contend that computer software does not deserve a
reputation for reliability.36 Computer programmers modify and test the
programs they write with varying degrees of thoroughness and expertise.
Also, users or auditors may not discover errors until after months of
processing.37 Conversely, others argue that the software in use today is pre-
sumptively reliable.38 They contend that sophisticated testing techniques
developed over the years and the use of packaged software39 have contrib-
uted to the reliability of software.'
29. Note, Competency, supra note 2, at 105.
30. Singer, supra note 2, at 165-66.
31. Peritz, supra note 2, at 990 (also noting user expertise, industry marketing practices, and
the conversion process as factors influencing a computer system's reliability and the accuracy of
its output); Singer, supra note 2, at 163.
32. See United States v. Russo, 480 F.2d 1228 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1157
(1974); Singer, supra note 2, at 163; Comment, Presumption of Reliability, supra note 2, at 123.
33. Singer, supra note 2, at 163.
34. King v. State ex rel Murdoch Acceptance Corp., 222 So. 2d 393 (Miss. 1969).
35. Id at 398 (alterations in original).
36. See Singer, supra note 2, at 164.
37. Id
38. See Comment, Presumption of Reliability, supra note 2, at 123-24.
39. Id at 120 n.4 (packaged software is a pre-programmed set of programs for use in specific
applications areas such as accounts receivable or payroll and usually comes with user manuals,
error message glossary, and a hot-line number to call for help with problems); see also Note,
Competency, supra note 2, at 109 (programs with errors will not last long in marketplace). But see
Peritz, supra note 2, at 992-93 (users of packaged software not likely to recognize errors).
40. Comment, Presumption of Reliability, supra note 2, at 123-24.
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Errors can occur when humans enter data into a computer file or
database.41 Therefore, computer programs edit input for errors which, de-
pending on the quality of the editing routine, may make data created by a
computer more or less reliable than data created by traditional methods of
record-keeping. Optical character readers read input without a chance for
human error42 and increase the reliability of computer-generated evidence.
Applications controls include input controls, processing controls, and
output controls. Properly implemented applications controls can contrib-
ute to the trustworthiness and accuracy of a computer system printout.
43
Input controls include input editing routines and reporting of input er-
rors.' Processing controls and output controls assure that the system exe-
cutes in the intended manner and that the system creates accurate output.45
A computer's security system also contributes to the trustworthiness
and accuracy of computer-generated evidence.46 A security system denies
unauthorized access to a computer system's programs, reports, hardware,
or on-line environment.47 Although most computer systems have some
type of security system, the publicized success of "hackers" and the poten-
tial for fraud and criminal acts connected with computer systems indicates
that not all security systems work as intended.48
III. THE ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST REQUIRING STRICTER
FOUNDATIONS FOR COMPUTER PRINTOUTS
A. The Argument for Requiring a Stricter Foundation
for Computer Printouts
What type of foundation should courts require as a condition of admis-
sibility for computer printouts?49 The few reported decisions on computer
printouts as evidence contain superficial and inconsistent analyses of this
issue-providing little guidance for attorneys and judges."
41. See Johnston, supra note 2, at 673; Comment, Presumption of Reliability, supra note 2, at
124.
42. Singer, supra note 2, at 164.
43. Id. at 165.
44. Id. at 165-66.
45. Id. at 166.
46. See Peritz, supra note 2, at 990-91; Singer, supra note 2, at 167.
47. Singer, supra note 2, at 167.
48. See Susan Hubbell Nycum, The Criminal Law Aspects of Computer Abuse, 5 RUTGERS J.
COMPUTERS AND THE LAW 271 (1976); Peritz, supra note 2, at 991; John K. Taber, A Survey of
Computer Crime Studies, 2 COMPUTER/L.J. 275 (1980).
49. See MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 314, at 885.
50. See, e.g., United States v. Edick, 432 F.2d 350, 354 (4th Cir. 1970) (admission without
analysis); Johnston, supra note 2, at 673, 676.
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The argument for requiring a stricter foundation than is currently re-
quired rests on two related premises. First, the legal community does not
adequately appreciate the limits of computer technology and therefore does
not apply the existing rules in a manner that assures fairness and justice."1
Second, a computer printout carries with it false indicia of trustworthiness,
accuracy, and reliability.52
Judicial policies and the misunderstandings of the limits of computer
reliability promote the admissibility of unsubstantiated evidence. At the
trial level, counsel must raise evidentiary issues53 and courts have liberal
policies of admissibility and discretion in admitting evidence. 4 However,
counsel often does not appreciate the limits of computer reliability and ac-
curacy, and fact-finders are prejudicially swayed by computer output. Ac-
cordingly, trial courts cannot make fair rulings about printouts.5 5 At the
appellate level, courts reluctantly reverse lower courts' questionable deci-
sions on other grounds.5 6 Appellate courts cannot easily reverse for abuse
of discretion without clear standards for deciding computer evidence
issues.
57
This combination of judicial policy together with the prejudicial nature
of computer printouts results in the admission of inaccurate and untrust-
worthy evidence. Stronger foundation requirements would remedy this
problem by increasing the probability that a printout is accurate and trust-
worthy. Furthermore, current practices do not treat the parties fairly be-
cause, even if discovery related to computerized evidence takes place,58
analyzing an opponent's system may entail excessive time and expense, ef-
fectively precluding an argument based on evidentiary issues.59
51. See Peritz, supra note 2, at 960; Singer, supra note 2, at 158.
52. See MARK A. DOMBROFF, DOMBROFF ON UNFAIR TACTIcs § 14.37, at 510 (2d ed. 1984)
("The very fact of a computer does seem to add weight and credibility to the evidence with which
it is connected."); Peritz, supra note 2, at 960; Sprowl, supra note 2, at 547; Note, Appropriate
Foundation, supra note 2, at 79; Note, Competency, supra note 2, at 108.
53. See United States v. Vela, 673 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1982); FED. R. EvID. 103.
54. Peritz, supra note 2, at 958.
55. Id
56. Id (citing United States v. Fendley, 522 F.2d 181, 191 (5th Cir. 1975) (Godbold, J.,
dissenting)).
57. Singer, supra note 2, at 171 n.35.
58. Cf Edward F. Sherman & Stephen 0. Kinnard, The Development, Discovery and Use of
Computer Support Systems in Achieving Efficiency in Litigation, 79 COLUM. L. R-v. 267 (1979)
(discovery of computer-based litigation support systems).
59. Peritz, supra note 2, at 960-61.
1992]
MARQUETE LAW REVIEW
B. The Argument Against New Rules of Evidence and Stricter
Foundation Requirements for Computer Printouts
The argument against new rules of evidence and stricter foundation re-
quirements for computer printouts is based on the premise that technologi-
cal advances and experience have improved the trustworthiness and
accuracy of computer printouts. Supporters of this argument conclude that
computer-generated evidence should enjoy a presumption of reliability.'
Judge Weinstein notes: "Despite reports of errors made by computers, well
operated computer systems achieve high levels of accuracy, substantially
greater than is possible for people making hand calculations. Machine and
human mistakes can be minimized by new techniques of prevention, detec-
tion and correction."6 Others argue that computers do not introduce any
new evidentiary issues. 2 The possibility of errors did not begin with the
arrival of computers, rather, it has always existed." In addition, the reli-
ance of the business world on computers provides a circumstantial guaran-
tee of trustworthiness."
Moreover, the legal community65 and jurors have an increased aware-
ness of the limits of computer reliability. This increased awareness removes
any false indicia of trustworthiness and accuracy that computer-generated
evidence might have once carried.66 Finally, requiring proponents of com-
puter printouts to supply extensive foundation testimony unfairly burdens
the proponent of such evidence, and increases the complexity and decreases
the efficiency of trials.67 Any doubts regarding the accuracy of the evidence
should affect the weight, not the admissibility, of the evidence.6
60. Comment, Presumption of Reliability, supra note 2, at 153-54.
61. WEINSTEIN, supra note 2, 1001(4)[07], at 1001-94.
62. See, eg., DOMBROFF, supra note 52, § 14.37, at 510 (a computer is just a "high speed
calculator").
63. See, e.g., United States v. Orozco, 590 F.2d 789, 794 (9th Cir. 1979), cert denied, 442
U.S. 920 (1979).
64. See, e.g., MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 306, at 872, § 314, at 885 ("The usual conditions
for the [business records exception] are applicable.").
65. "As one of the many who have received computerized bills and dunning letters for ac-
counts long since paid, I am not prepared to accept the product of a computer as the equivalent of
Holy Writ." Perma Research & Dev. v. Singer Co., 542 F.2d 111, 121 (2d Cir. 1976) (Van
Graafeiland, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 987 (1976).
66. "In this wondrous age of computerization, just about every adult has at least one horror
story to tell-checks bounced by mistake, an erroneous rejection of a credit card purchase, bills
rendered for merchandise never ordered, or insurance policies threatened with cancellation for
some unexplained delinquency." BENDER, supra note 6, at § 6.02[2] n.3.
67. Peritz, supra note 2, at 961 n.21; see also Comment, Presumption of Reliability, supra note
2, at 153.
68. Comment, Presumption of Reliability, supra note 2, at 134-35. This argument also notes
the negative reaction to British statutes that were created to deal specifically with computer-gener-
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IV. APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE TO
COMPUTER PRINTOUTS
Courts, lawyers, and the drafters of the rules of evidence have addressed
many technological changes over the years. 9 In discussing the law's treat-
ment of computer-generated business records, Judge Brown, the former
Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
wrote:
For a machine now capable of making 240,000 additions per second,
reading magnetic tape containing 4 1/2 million digits of information
on a single reel at a.breath-taking speed, to speak of the shop book
rule is, indeed, an anachronism. But we operate more comfortably
with familiar concepts. Just as that rule dispensed with the necessity
of producing the person who made the entry, the law must find a
means of giving judicial currency to that which is reliable and ac-
ceptable in the market place.7"
The Federal Rules of Evidence are to "be construed to secure fairness in
administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promo-
tion of growth and development of the law of evidence to the end that the
truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined."71 This Sec-
tion of the Comment focuses on the question of whether the current appli-
cation72 of the Federal Rules of Evidence governing authentication,73 the
ated evidence. See McCORMICK, supra note 2, § 314, at 886 n.12; The Civil Evidence Act 1968
§ 5, reprinted in 17 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND AND WALES, at 160 (4th ed. 1986)
(Section 5, "Admissibility of statements produced by computers" contains approximately one and
a quarter pages of statutory text); The Police and Criminal Civil Evidence Act 1984 § 69, re-
printed in 17 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND AND WALES, at 209 (4th ed. 1986) ("Evi-
dence from Computer Records").
69. Connery & Levy, supra note 2, at 266 (admissibility of tachography, neutron activation
analysis, microfilm and reproductions, radio transcripts between airplanes and airports); Com-
ment, Presumption of Reliability, supra note 2, at 149 n.198 (telephone and radar, inter alia).
70. John R. Brown, Electronic Brains and the Legal Mind: Computing the Data Computer's
Collision with Law, 71 YALE L.. 239, 248 (1961). The shop-book rule was an English predecessor
of the business records exception to the hearsay rule which required, among other things:
[Tihat the party kept no clerk, that some of the goods sold had been delivered or some of
the services had actually been performed; that the party had a good reputation for correct
and honest dealing; that the books bore an honest appearance. Any interlineations, era-
sures, deletions, or other suspicious circumstances barred the use of the books. The entries
must have been made reasonably near the time of the delivery of the goods or rendition of
the services to which the entries related.
BENDER, supra note 6, § 6.01[4], at 6-7 n.10 (citing Gerald J. Norville, The Uniform Business
Records as Evidence Act, 27 OR. L. REv. 188, 190-91 (1948)).
71. FED. R. EVID. 102.
72. Federal cases decided before the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence on July 1,
1975, and state cases are cited when the issues are substantially the same as those that arise under
the Federal Rules.
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business74 and public records75 exceptions to the hearsay rules, and summa-
ries76 to computer printouts effectuate the policies underlying the Rules:
fairness between the parties, efficiency, justice, and the ascertainment of
truth.7
A. Authentication
1. Authentication Under Rule 901(b)(9)
"The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition pre-
cedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding
that the matter in question is what its proponent claims. ' '78 When the "ac-
curacy of a result is dependent upon a process or system which produces
it," 79 "[e]vidence describing a process or system used to produce a result
and showing that the process or system produces an accurate result" 0 con-
forms to the requirements of authentication under Rule 901(b)(9). 1 Rule
901(b)(9) does not preclude a judge from taking judicial notice of the accu-
racy of a process or system.82 Rule 902(4) treats certified copies of public
records as self-authenticating.8 3
Most of the early cases that set standards for authenticating computer
printouts imposed a substantial burden on the proponent of such evidence.
Some of these cases also discussed factors required for the admissibility of
computer printouts that today have relevance to Rule 901(b)(9)'s inquiry
into the reliability of a computer system and the accuracy of its result.
73. FED. R. EvID. 901, 902.
74. FED. R. EvID. 803(6), 803(7).
75. FED. R. EvID. 803(8), 803(10).
76. FED. R. EvID. 1006.
77. See FED. R. EvID. 102.
78. FED. R. EvID. 901(a).
79. FED. R. EVID. 901 advisory committee's note (expressly including computers under
901(b)(9)).
80. FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(9).
81. For examples of types of computer-generated evidence, other than business and public
records, that are authenticated under Rule 901(b)(9) see, WEINSTEIN, supra note 2, at
901(b)(9)[02]. Weinstein cites as examples: Rosado v. Wyman, 322 F. Supp. 1173, 1180
(E.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 402 U.S. 991 (1971) (calculation of welfare benefits for hundreds of
thousands of families); Bush v. Martin, 251 F. Supp. 484, 506 n.73 (S.D. Tex. 1966) (analysis of
census data in reapportionment case); Butterworth v. Dempsey, 237 F. Supp. 302, 313 (D. Conn.
1965) (analysis of census data in reapportionment case). It should also be noted that Rule
901(b)(8) applies to "data compilations" that qualify as "ancient documents."
82. FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(9) advisory committee's note.
83. FED. R. EVID. 902(4).
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In the seminal case of Transport Indemnity Co. v. Seib,84 the Nebraska
Supreme Court discussed the authentication of a computer printout.8 5 The
court considered 141 pages of trial testimony in deciding whether the foun-
dation for the evidence was properly laid. The court admitted the evidence.
Two years later, in King v. ex rel Murdock Acceptance Corp.,86 the Mis-
sissippi Supreme Court set down the following guidelines for the admissibil-
ity of computer-generated business records:
(1) the electronic computing equipment is recognized as standard
equipment;
(2) the entries are made in the regular course of business at or rea-
sonably near the time of the happening of the event recorded; and
(3) the foundation testimony satisfies the court that the source of
information, method and time of preparation were such as to indi-
cate its trustworthiness and justify its admission.87
Some time later, the Chancery Division of the Supreme Court of New
Jersey set down more detailed guidelines which, in addition to laying the
business records foundation, the proponent of computer-generated business
records had to meet:
(1) the competency of the computer operators...
(2) the type of computer used and its acceptance in the field as stan-
dard and efficient equipment...
(3) the procedure for the input and output of information, including
controls, tests, and checks for accuracy and reliability...
(4) the mechanical operations of the machine... and
(5) the meaning and identity of the records themselves.88
In United States v. Scholle,89 the court stated:
Even where the procedure and motive for keeping business records
provide a check on their trustworthiness... , the complex nature of
computer storage calls for a more comprehensive foundation. As-
suming properly functioning equipment is used, there must be not
only a showing that the requirements of the Business Records Act
have been satisfied, but also the original source of the computer pro-
gram must be delineated, and the procedures for input control in-
cluding tests used to assure accuracy and reliability must be
presented. 90
84. Transport Indem. Co. v. Seib, 132 N.W.2d 871 (Neb. 1967).
85. Id. at 874.
86. King v. ex reL Murdock Acceptance Corp., 222 So. 2d 393 (Miss. 1969).
87. Id at 398.
88. Monarch Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Genser, 383 A.2d 475, 487-88 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1977).
89. United States v. Scholle, 553 F.2d 1109 (8th Cir. 1977), cerL denied, 434 U.S. 940 (1977).
90. Id at 1125 (citations omitted).
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In People v. Bovio,91 the court reversed a conviction because the founda-
tion lacked testimony regarding whether standard hardware created the evi-
dence and whether the program that created the report was standard,
unmodified, and run according to instructions.92
Modem courts generally employ liberal standards when assessing the
admissibility of computer-generated evidence.9 3 Many courts completely
bypass authentication for business records, requiring only the foundation
for the business records exception to the hearsay rule.94 One commentator
has observed that "[c]ourts seem to treat computerized records as if they
were self-authenticating." 95 Commentators have criticized this relaxed
standard because it allows untrustworthy evidence into the record and un-
fairly burdens the opponent of such evidence.96
Although courts may have relaxed authentication standards, some
courts today require advance notice of the intent to use computer-generated
evidence97 and require that the proponent give the opponent an opportunity
to examine the program used to produce the output.98 Other courts have
discussed requiring discovery related to the computerized evidence. 99
As the cases and comments discussed herein indicate, the question now
is whether the relaxation of authentication standards treats the parties
fairly, results in justice, and increases the probability of finding the truth.
The Advisory Committee's notes to Rule 901(b)(9) fail to resolve this di-
lemma. The committee cites Seib,1" which contained 141 pages of trial
authenticated testimony on system reliability, and two other cases 01 that
91. People v. Bovio, 455 N.E.2d 829 (Ill. 1983).
92. Id at 833.
93. See, e.g., United States v. Vela, 673 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1982); WEINSTEIN, supra note 2,
1 901(b)(9)[02], at 901-111.
94. See, eg., Vela, 673 F.2d at 90; Perma Research & Dev. v. Singer Co., 542 F.2d 111, 125
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 987 (1976); MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 314, at 885-86 n.6.
95. Peritz, supra note 2, at 981-82.
96. See id. at 978-84; Singer, supra note 2, at 168-76.
97. E.g., United States v. Cepeda Penes, 577 F.2d 754, 760-61 (lst Cir. 1978); United States v.
Dioguardi, 428 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 825 (1970); see also WEINSTEIN,
supra note 2, 1 901(b)(9)[01], at 901-09.
98. E.g., United States v. Russo, 480 F.2d 1228, 1241 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1157 (1974); United States v. Dioguardi, 428 F.2d 1033, 1038 (2nd Cir. 1970), cerL denied, 400
U.S. 825 (1970).
99. See, e.g., United States v. Scholle, 553 F.2d 1109, 1125 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 940 (1970); United States v. Liebert, 519 F.2d 542, 547-51 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 985 (1975).
100. Transport Indem. Co. v. Seib, 132 N.W.2d 871 (Neb. 1967).
101. Merrick v. United States Rubber Co., 440 P.2d 314 (Ariz. 1968); State v. Veres, 436
P.2d 629 (Ariz. 1968).
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relied on the circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness inherent in busi-
ness records. 10 2
Commenting on the extensive authentication testimony required in
Seib,103 Judge Weinstein indicated that "[s]uch an extensive demonstration
is no longer necessary in view of the widespread acceptance of [computer-
generated evidence]."" ° Judge Weinstein contends:
A computer system with a print-out is no more obscure than a man-
ual computation .... The data is simply stored electronically rather
than manually. If the computer has been properly programmed and
operated there is less likelihood of error by machine computations
than there is by human figuring.... Since there is a chance that the
computer output is inaccurate, the person offering the computer
print-outs in evidence should, in addition to explaining the program-
ming methods used, give a description of the controls used to detect
both human and machine errors. This precaution is not required as
a foundation for admissibility but as a tactical precaution to forestall
any doubt in the trier's mind. 5
In addition, Judge Weinstein adopts the Manual for Complex Litigation's
(Manual) approach to pre-trial notice, suggesting proponents should give
advance notice of their intent to use computer-generated evidence, thereby
enabling the opponent to, by expert testimony if necessary, verify the accu-
racy of the system.10 6
Dean McCormick takes the position that an authenticating witness need
only show that a printout is a "correct reflection of what is in the machine,
rather than ... what is in the machine is correct." 10 7
The Manual places the burden of authenticating computerized evidence
on the proponent of the evidence.108 Although intended for use in complex
litigation, "the [Manual for Complex Litigation, Second's] principles of
management, and many of the techniques it describes may be useful in
criminal cases, in state courts, and in routine federal civil litigation."109
102. FED. R. EVID. 901 advisory committee's note.
103. See Seib, 132 N.W.2d at 871.
104. WEINSTEIN, supra note 2, 901(b)(9)[02], at 901-134.
105. Id at 901-134-35 (citation omitted).
106. Id t 901(b)(9)[01], at 901-109.
107. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 314 n.6. For a criticism of this approach, see Peritz, supra
note 2, at 980 ("[MIIow can we presume that 'what is in the computer' is itself reliable?").
108. MANUAL, SECOND, supra note 2, § 21.446, at 61.
109. Id, § 10, at 1; see also Peritz, supra note 2 (arguing that the recommendations of the
prior edition of the Manual for Complex Litigation be adopted for all cases involving computer-
generated business records).
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The Manual assumes authentication of computerized evidence will take
place under Rule 901(b)(9)." 0 The recommendations in the Manual shift
the emphasis that prior editions of The Manual for Complex Litigation
placed on admissibility to that of weight. 11
The Manual recommends that discovery112 take place regarding the re-
liability of computerized evidence." 3 Such discovery includes inquiry into
"the underlying source materials, the procedures for storage and process-
ing, and some testing of the reliability of the results obtained.""' 4 A party
can request discovery in machine readable form so that the requesting party
can analyze the evidence on its own computer." 5
However, the Manual takes the position that the proponent need not
prove the evidence is "free from all error or possible error.""' 6 The trier of
110. See MANUAL, SECOND, supra note 2, § 21.446, at 61 n.81.
111. For example, the prior edition of the Manual for Complex Litigation, the MANUAL FOR
COMPLEX LITIGATION (5th ed. 1982), contained six recommendations designed to close the "gap
between the competence of the juror, the bench, and the bar on one hand, and the competence of
the persons and machines employed by business and science to ascertain facts and draw conclu-
sions, on the other." Id. § 2.71, at 110. The recommendations included:
2.714 Fourth Recommendation. When computer-maintained records and analyses of raw
data are valuable sources of evidence, their use and admissibility should be promoted and
facilitated. Computer inputs and outputs, the underlying data, and the program method
employed should be made available to the opposing party in advance of trial as a condition
ofadmissibility .... 2.716 Sixth Recommendation. Computer-maintained records kept in
the regular course of business and printouts prepared especially for litigation should be
admitted if the court finds that reliable computer equipment and techniques have been used
and that the material is of probative value. The court should therefore require, well in
advance of trial, that (a) the offering party demonstrate that the input procedures conform
to the standard practice of persons engaged in the business or profession of the party or
person from whom the printout is obtained; (b) in the case of a printout prepared especially
for trial, the offering party demonstrate that the person from whom the printout is ob-
tained relied on the data base in making a business or professional judgment within a
reasonably short period of time before producing the printout sought to be introduced; (c)
the offering party provide expert testimony that the processing program reliably and accu-
rately processes the data in the data base; and (d) the opposing party be given the opportu-
nity to depose the offeror's witness and to engage a witness of its own to evaluate the
processing procedure.
Id. §§ 2.714, 2.716 (emphasis added); see also Peritz, supra note 2, at 959 n.15.
112. Discovery can be obtained of "data compilations" under FED. R. Civ. P. 34. Such
discovery is, of course, subject to the work product doctrine and protective orders for trade secrets
and privileged information. MANUAL, SECOND, supra note 2, § 21.446 n.79.
113. Id. § 21.446, at 59.
114. Id.
115. Id. (citing National Union Elec. Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1257
(E.D. Pa. 1980)).
116. MANUAL, SECOND, supra note 2, § 21.446, at 61 n.81.
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fact should decide the ultimate issue of accuracy, with the possibility of
errors affecting only the weight of the evidence, not admissibility. 1 7
The current procedure for authenticating computer printouts has been
criticized. One commentator suggests applying the more stringent recom-
mendations of the fifth edition of the Manual for Complex Litigation to all
cases, and argues for requiring a party to authenticate computer printouts
under 901(b)(9) in addition to laying the foundation required by the Rule
803(6) hearsay exception. 1 8 Other commentators have proposed new rules
of evidence to deal with computer printouts.1 19
117. Id.; see also WEINSTEIN, supra note 2, 901(b)(9)[02].
118. Peritz, supra note 2, at 978-84.
119. Singer advocates changing Rule 901 to exclude computer systems and proposes the fol-
lowing Rule 901(c):
(c) COMPUTER SYSTEM OR PROGRAM. Evidence describing a computer program or sys-
tem of computer programs used to produce a result and showing, by description of the
computer hardware, programming method, stored database, operation of the system, sys-
tem security, and specific application controls, that the program or system produces an
accurate result, satisfies the authentication requirement for a computer programmer [sic]
or system. Voluminous testimony should not be required to lay a foundation for the com-
puter system or process. For instance, the explanation of the computer hardware need not
be more than an overview by the manufacturer of the central processing unit and of the
types of input/output devices used by the system.
Singer, supra note 2, at 174. Singer also proposes modifying Rule 803(6) by adding:
The evidence described in this paragraph does not include evidence which has been created
by a program or programs if it was not the regular practice of the business to translate
computer-stored information into the form in which it is introduced with that program or
programs. A computer printout or summary of otherwise admissible computer stored evi-
dence is admissible through Rule 1006.
IL at 180, adding a Rule 803(25):
Public records or the record of a public official as referred to in the exception categories for
the hearsay rule are not to be interpreted to apply to records which have as their source a
computer system. These records are not excluded by the hearsay rule so long as they meet
the requirements of Rule 803(6) or Rule 803(7).
Id at 183, modifying Rule 1003 by adding:
provided that, in the case of a duplicate of data stored in a computer or similar device, the
proponent of the evidence satisfies the requirement of Rule 1006(b).
Id at 188, and adding Rule 1006(b):
(B) COMPUTER STORED DATA. If admissible data are stored in a computer similar device,
and a printout of that data, or other output which is readable by sight, is presented, both
the process which created the computer stored data and the process which translated the
data must satisfy the requirements of Rule 901(c). The following shall be made available
for examination or copying, or both, by other parties at a reasonable time and place: 1. The
original computer stored data being translated. 2. The program or programs used to trans-
late the data. 3. Documentation for the computer stored data and programs. The court
may order that they be produced in court. The process used to translate the data shall be
shown by the testimony by a qualified witness.
Id. at 188-89; see also Note, Appropriate Foundation, supra note 2, at 91 for the following sug-
gested statute:
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
The argument for requiring authentication under 901(b)(9) contends
that the current practice of bypassing authentication and requiring only the
business records foundation 2 ' treats the parties unfairly because computer
printouts are not as reliable as other types of business records. In addition,
requiring only the business records foundation unfairly places the burden
on the opponent of the evidence to establish that the computer does not
produce an accurate result.12' Computer-generated evidence should thus be
authenticated under Rule 901, in addition to meeting the foundation re-
quirements of Rule 803(6), because the current practice allows parties to
introduce untrustworthy evidence. 122
Furthermore, the argument continues, Rule 902(4), which treats public
records as self-authenticating, should not apply to certified computer-gener-
ated public records because the accuracy of public records, like that of busi-
ness records, depends on the system that produces them. 123
This argument distinguishes between taking judicial notice of the accu-
racy of a system or process and taking judicial notice of the result of a
system or process.' 24 The use of radar provides an example:1 25 If a court
can take judicial notice of the reliability of radar, yet require proof of the
accuracy of a given reading, a court can also take judicial notice of the
reliability of computer systems but still require proof of the accuracy of a
given printout.1 26
Other commentators contend that, rather than requiring strict founda-
tion requirements, printouts should enjoy a presumption of reliability.127
SECTION 1. A computer printout recording a business act, event, or transaction shall be
admissible into evidence to prove the truth of the matters asserted therein provided the
offering party shows:
1) that the input procedures conform to standard practices in the industry; and, the entries
are made in the regular course of business, and
2) that he relied on the data in the database in making a business decision(s), within a
reasonably short period of time before or after producing the printout sought to be intro-
duced at trial, and
3) by expert testimony that the program reliably and accurately processes the data in the
database.
120. See, eg., MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 314, at 885-86 n.6.
121. E.g., United States v. De Georgia, 470 F.2d 889 (9th Cir. 1969); see also Singer, supra
note 2, at 168-69.
122. Peritz, supra note 2, at 976-78. Peritz also argues that current practice contradicts the
meaning of 803(6). Id. at 985.
123. Singer, supra note 2, at 170.
124. Peritz, supra note 2, at 983.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. E.g., Comment, Presumption of Reliability, supra note 2.
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Courts should take judicial notice128 of the reliability of a computer-gener-
ated business record upon a showing that the record satisfies the business
records foundation.129 Requiring extensive authentication confuses the rel-
evancy concerns of authentication with the assurances of trustworthiness
required under the exceptions to the hearsay rule.13 This argument ap-
pears to accord with current judicial treatment. 131
One commentator strikes a half-way position by distinguishing between
types of programs that courts can judicially notice as reliable. 132 Courts
should take judicial notice of the reliability of programs used with accurate
results over a long period of time, as well as packaged programs in use by
many customers, but not customized programs or packaged programs that
allow the user to customize the environment for particular purposes as
reliable. 133
2. The Authenticating Witness
Courts have generally held that the proponent of a printout need not
supply a computer programmer or operator as an authenticating witness.
134
For example, in United States v. Linn,135 the court characterized a defense
objection that the authenticating witness lacked "personal knowledge" be-
cause she could not distinguish between "menus," "databases," and com-
puter "code" as "frivolous."' 136 However, some courts have suggested that
the authenticating witness should have some familiarity with the records
and the testing of the program.
137
The fifth edition of the Manualfor Complex Litigation 138 recommended
that the proponent provide "expert testimony that the processing program
reliably and accurately process the data in the database." 139 The Manual
128. See FED. R. EVID. 201.
129. Comment, Presumption of Reliability, supra note 2, at 149-50.
130. Id. at 148-49.
131. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
132. Note, Competency, supra note 2, at 109.
133. Id.
134. United States v. Miller, 771 F.2d 1219, 1237 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. De Geor-
gia, 420 F.2d 889, 893-94 (9th Cir. 1969); State v. Veres, 436 P.2d 629, 637-38 (Ariz. 1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1014 (1969).
135. United States v. Linn, 880 F.2d 209 (9th Cir. 1989).
136. Id. at 216.
137. United States v. Russo, 480 F.2d 1228, 1241 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1157
(1974); Merrick v. United States Rubber Co., 440 P.2d 314 (Ariz. 1968).
138. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (5th ed. 1982).
139. Id. § 2.716(c).
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for Complex Litigation, Second, published three years later, has deleted this
recommendation. 140
Some commentators argue that if a proponent prepares a computer-gen-
erated record for trial that party should also provide an authenticating wit-
ness familiar with the language of the program that produced the record. 141
Others maintain that requiring expert authenticating witnesses places too
great a burden on the proponent of computer printouts. 42 Because of the
volatility of the software and hardware markets, and because one company
can use hardware and software from a myriad of vendors to produce one
record, it may be impracticable financially and otherwise to produce exten-
sive expert authenticating evidence.143 Therefore, any witness that can
show that the evidence is what its proponent purports should suffice. 44
B. Records of Regularly Conducted Activity
1. Records of Regularly Conducted Activity Foundational
Requirements
Under Rules 803(6) and 803(7), computer printouts present the issue of
what type of foundation sufficiently indicates trustworthiness. 145 The previ-
ous section of this Comment discussed the related issue of whether courts
should require authentication of printouts under Rule 901(b)(9). The two
issues are closely related because if a party authenticates a printout under
Rule 901(b)(9), the perception of a business record's trustworthiness will
probably increase, while if a court does not require a party to authenticate
under Rule 90 1(b)(9), the opponent of such evidence may more readily raise
objections to its trustworthiness. These objections will most likely note the
lack of the same type of facts that authentication under Rule 901(b)(9)
would establish.
The Federal Rules allow exceptions to the hearsay rule because "under
appropriate circumstances a hearsay statement may contain circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness to justify non-production of the declarant in
person at the trial even though he may be available."'" Federal Rule of
140. MANUAL, SECOND, supra note 2, § 21.446, at 61.
141. Singer, supra note 2, at 172.
142. Comment, Presumption of Reliability, supra note 2, at 151.
143. Id. at 151-52.
144. See, e.g., United States v. Vela, 673 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1982) (telephone company em-
ployee); Rosenburg v. Collins, 624 F.2d 659 (5th Cir. 1980) (company comptroller).
145. Singer, supra note 2, at 177.
146. FED. R. EvID. 803 advisory committee's note.
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Evidence 803 provides that "the following is not excluded by the hearsay
rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness":147
(6) Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, re-
port, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, event, condi-
tions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from
information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the
course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the
regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum,
report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of
the custodian, or other qualified witness, unless the source of infor-
mation or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack
of trustworthiness.14
(7) Absence of entry in records kept in accordance with the provi-
sions of paragraph (6). Evidence that a matter is not included in the
memoranda, reports, records, or data compilations, in any form,
kept in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (6), to prove the
nonoccurrence or nonexistence of the matter, if the matter was of a
kind of which a memorandum, report, record, or data compilation
was regularly made and preserved, unless the sources of information
or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness. 149
Courts consider records of regularly conducted activity unusually relia-
ble for four different reasons: "systematic checking,... regularity and con-
tinuity which produce habits of precision, . . . [the] actual experience of
business in relying upon them, . . . [and the] duty to make an accurate
record as part of a continuing job or occupation."'' 50 Even though courts
consider these records reliable, opponents can attack the foundation as
lacking trustworthiness.1 5 '
On its face, Rule 803(6) includes "data compilations." The Advisory
Committee's notes state that the term "data compilation," as used in Rule
803(6), includes "electronic computer storage."'' 2 Additionally, courts
have interpreted data compilation to include computer printouts.1
5 3
147. FED. R. EvID. 803.
148. FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
149. FED. R. EVID. 803(7).
150. FED. R. EvID. 803(6) advisory committee's note.
151. See, eg., People v. Genser, 288 N.E.2d 24 (Ill. 1972); Railroad Comm'n v. Southern
Pacific Co., 468 S.W.2d 125 (Tex. Ct. App. 1971); State v. McGee, 329 A.2d 581 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1974).
152. FED. R. EVWD. 803(6) advisory committee's note.
153. See generally Donald M. Zupanec, Annotation, Admissibility of Computerized Private
Business Records, 7 A.L.R. 4th 8 (1981) (examples include commercial records of account, bank
records, telephone records, insurance records, hospital records, construction records, automobile
dealer inventory records).
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Despite the plain language of Rule 803(6), some argue for stricter foun-
dational requirements or new rules for computer-generated business records
so that the trier of fact may better assess the record's trustworthiness. 154
"In particular, the trier of fact is unlikely to appreciate the various elec-
tronic, mechanical and human errors that can cause inaccuracies in output,
without the benefit of substantial, foundational testimony." ' 5 Others claim
courts should treat computerized business records like any other business
record.15 6 Still others contend that a court should presume that computer-
generated business records are reliable.157
Courts appear to treat computer printouts like other business records, if
not more favorably."5 In United States v. Fendley,'59 the court required,
under the old Federal Business Records Act,"6 that a printout: (1) be
made and kept in the regular course of business, (2) for ordinary business
purposes and relied on by the business, and (3) not a mere accumulation of
hearsay or uninformed opinion. 161 The dissent noted that the proponent
laid an inadequate foundation because "the only entrant or recorder re-
vealed by the foregoing testimony is the computer" and also noted that the
proponent may have created the printout specifically for use in the
litigation.62
United States v. Scholle 163 dealt with the issue of the foundation re-
quired under Rule 803(6) for Drug Enforcement Agency records in a crimi-
nal conviction. The court noted that data compilations were included
within the rule and that printouts were not inherently unreliable, but stated
that the complex nature of computer evidence required a greater foundation
that would include the source of the program, the procedures for input, and
154. Johnston, supra note 2, at 673.
155. Id. Cf Perma Research & Dev. v. Singer Co., 542 F.2d 111, 121 (2d Cir. 1976) (Van
Graafeiland, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 987 (1976).
156. See, e.g., United States v. Vela, 673 F.2d 86, 89-90 (5th Cir. 1982) ("computer evidence
is not intrinsically unreliable.... Vela's arguments for a level of authentication greater than that
regularly practiced by the company in its own business practices go beyond the rule and its rea-
sonable purpose to admit truthful evidence"). The district judge determined computer generated
records were "even more reliable than.., average business record[s] because they are not even
touched by the hands of man." Id at 90.
157. Comment, Presumption of Reliability, supra note 2, at 132.
158. See, e.g., Vela, 673 F.2d at 86.
159. United States v. Fendley, 522 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 425 U.S.
435 (1976).
160. Former 28 U.S.C. § 1732(a), repealed by Pub. L. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975).
161. Fendley, 522 F.2d at 185.
162. Id. at 191-94 (Godbold, J., dissenting).
163. United States v. Scholle, 553 F.2d 1109 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 940
(1977).
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tests for accuracy and reliability.'11 The court did not discuss why it ana-
lyzed the records under the business records exception rather than the pub-
lic records exception.
The court in United States v. De Georgia 6 discussed the draft of Rule
803(7) and admitted testimony of a car rental security manager regarding
the absence of a rental record in a prosecution for interstate transportation
of a stolen rental car. 166
Rule 803(6) requires a printout be made "at or near the time" of the
events recorded.1 67 This requirement tends to increase the probability of
accuracy of the records. 168 Some argue that computer printouts are not
made at or near the time of the events recorded.169 However, in Transport
Indemnity Co. v. Seib,170 the Nebraska Supreme Court rejected that argu-
ment as exalting "form over substance" because, although the proponent
might have printed the report for use at trial, the record was created in the
usual course of business.
17 1
In general, courts have adopted the Seib view on contemporaneity of
recording. In United States v. Russo,172 the court stated:
It would restrict the admissibility of computerized records too se-
verely to hold that the computer product, as well as the input upon
which it is based, must be produced at or within a reasonable time
after each act or transaction to which it relates. 173
The Russo court found such records trustworthy, noting the Federal Busi-
ness Records Act should be "liberally construed" to bring the "realities of
business and professional practices" into the courtroom.' 74
164. Id. at 1109.
165. United States v. De Georgia, 420 F.2d 889 (9th Cir. 1969).
166. Id at 891.
167. FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
168. WEINSTEIN, supra note 2, 803(6)[05], at 803-193. Computer systems arguably make
many different records "at or near the time" of the event recorded: the document that was the
source of the input, the semiconductor storage, the record on disk or tape, and the printout. See,
eg., United States v. Russo, 480 F.2d 1228, 1237 (6th Cir. 1973), cert denied, 414 U.S. 1157
(1974); BENDER, supra note 6, § 6.03[2] at 6-17.
169. See Rigdon Reese, Note, Admissibility of Computer-Kept Business Records, 55 CORNELL
L.Q. 1033, 1045-46 (1970); cf Harned v. Credit Bureau, 513 P.2d 650, 653 (Wyo. 1973).
170. Transport Indem. Co. v. Seib, 132 N.W.2d 871 (Neb. 1965).
171. Id. at 875.
172. United States v. Russo, 480 F.2d 1228 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1157
(1974).
173. Id. at 1240.
174. Id.; see also United States v. Hutson, 821 F.2d 1015 (5th Cir. 1987) (admitted over
objection that printouts were created eight months after transaction, printout showed date of
original transaction); United States v. Sanders, 749 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1984).
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Rule 803(6) also requires that a party keep a record "in the course of a
regularly conducted business activity.117 5 This element can become an is-
sue when a program written specifically for creating the evidence for trial
produces the printout.17 6  One commentator proposes modifying Rule
803(6) to address this issue and recommends as an alternative that propo-
nents print records using utility programs1 7 that most computer systems
use. 1 78  Opponents can object to reports produced for trial as
untrustworthy.17
9
2. Summaries
If the underlying records are prepared in the usual course of business, a
court can admit summaries prepared for trial under Rule 1006.80 In addi-
tion, Rule 803(6) allows admission of a summary made in the regular
course of business. In United States v. Russo, 8' the court admitted a sum-
mary of records that were made in the usual course of business.'82 How-
ever, commentators have noted that even accurate summaries can mislead
through data selection.18 3
3. The Qualifying Witness
The knowledge of the qualifying witness may influence a court's deter-
mination of trustworthiness.18 4 However, courts generally do not require
the qualifying witness to have knowledge of the specific transaction that
created the record.18 5
175. FED. R. EvID. 803(6).
176. See, e.g., United States v. Fendley, 522 F.2d 181, 184 (5th Cir. 1975); Singer, supra note
2, at 179.
177. Singer, supra note 2, at 181 (such a program will often be part of the many programs
written for a system and vendors will often supply utility programs).
178. Id. at 181 n.56 (citing City of Seattle v. Heath, 520 P.2d 1392 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974));
see also BENDER, supra note 6, § 5.03[2], at 5-101 n.5 (suggesting the possibility of reading records
directly off tape in polarized light).
179. FED. R. EVID. 803(6); see generally Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 113-14 (1943)
(motive for creating report influences trustworthiness of record).
180. MANUAL, SECOND, supra note 2, § 21.446, at 61 nn.80, 81; Note, Competency, supra
note 2, at 111.
181. United States v. Russo, 480 F.2d 1228 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1157
(1974).
182. Id. at 1240. But see Sprowl, supra note 2, at 565 (calling Russo's holding that a summary
was an original business record "absurd").
183. Henak & Henak, supra note 6, at 58; Sprowl, supra note 2, at 563-65; Comment, Guide-
lines for Admissibility, supra note 2, at 961.
184. E.g., Railroad Comm'n v. Southern Pac. Co., 468 S.W.2d 125, 125 (Tex. Ct. App. 1971).
185. E.g., United States v. Fendley, 522 F.2d 181, 187 (5th Cir. 1975).
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In United States v. Jones I 6 the court held:
It is not essential that the offering witness be the recorder or even be
certain who recorded the item. It is sufficient that the witness be
able to identify the record as authentic and specify that it was made
and preserved in the regular course of business.1 8 7
The fifth edition of the Manual for Complex Litigation set out detailed
additional requirements for the foundation of computer-generated records
that were kept in the regular course of business and that were prepared for
trial."88 Those requirements included evidence of the input procedures and
expert testimony on the program." 9 The Manual for Complex Litigation,
Second, however, does not contain those two recommendations. 90
C. Public Records and Reports
Federal Rule 902(4) provides that certified copies of public records, "in-
cluding data compilations in any form," do not require extrinsic evidence of
authenticity as a condition precedent of admissibility 91 because "practical
considerations reduce the possibility of unauthenticity to a very small di-
mension. '  Rule 902(4) does not, however, preclude objections to
authenticity. 193
The Federal Rules allow public records as an exception to the hearsay
rule because of "the assumption [that] a public official will perform his duty
properly and the unlikelihood he will remember details independently of
the record." 194 Federal Rule of Evidence 803 provides that "[t]he following
are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available
as a witness": 195
(8) PUBLIC RECORDS AND REPORTS. Records, reports, statements,
or data compilations, in any form or public offices or agencies, set-
ting forth (A) the activities of the office or agency, or (B) matters
observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there
186. United States v. Jones, 554 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1977).
187. Id. at 252; see also United States v. Miller, 771 F.2d 1219, 1237 (9th Cir. 1985); United
States v. Young Brothers, 728 F.2d 682, 693 (5th Cir. 1984), cert denied, 469 U.S. 881 (1984)
(qualifying witness does not need to be preparer or attest to the accuracy of records); Rosenberg v.
Collins, 624 F.2d 659 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Verlin, 466 F. Supp. 155 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
188. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 2.71, at 110 (5th ed. 1982); see supra note 117
for text of recommendations.
189. IdL
190. MANUAL, SECOND, supra note 2, § 21.446, at 61.
191. FED. R. EvID. 902(4).
192. FED. R. EVID. 902 advisory committee's note.
193. Idt
194. FED. R. EvID. 803(8) advisory committee's note.
195. FED. R. EVID. 803.
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was a duty to report, excluding, however, in criminal cases matters
observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel, or
(C) in civil actions and proceeding against the Government in crimi-
nal cases, factual findings resulting from an investigation made pur-
suant to authority granted by law, unless the sources or other
circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness. 196
(10) ABSENCE OF PUBLIC RECORD OR ENTRY. To prove the ab-
sence of a record, report, statement, or data compilation, in any
form, or the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of a matter of which a
record, report, statement, or data compilation, in any form, was reg-
ularly made and preserved by a public office or agency, evidence in
the form of a certification in accordance with Rule 902, or testi-
mony, that diligent search failed to disclose the record, report, state-
ment, or data compilation, or entry.' 97
Far fewer published cases discuss computer-generated public records
than discuss computer-generated business records. The scarcity of pub-
lished decisions on the issue suggests in itself that such public records are
treated as self-authenticating under 902(4). In United States v. Farris, s
the court discussed the draft of Rule 902(4) and held, under a predecessor
of Rule 803(8), that public records certified by the Secretary of the Treasury
were sufficient to prove the failure to file tax returns, without further
authentication. 99
The court in United States v. Orozcoz°° allowed into evidence customs
records of car license numbers that had crossed the Mexican-American bor-
der, noting that the agents who entered the license numbers had no reason
to fabricate and "the possibility of an inaccurate entry is no greater here
than it would be in any other recording system.... [N]othing about this
recording procedure indicates a 'lack of trustworthiness.' "201
In United States v. Cepeda Penes, 2 the absence of computerized tax
records was used against a criminal defendant. The court recognized the
difficulty in assessing the reliability of the programming and accuracy of
196. FED. R. EvID. 803(8); see generally Thomas J. Goger, Annotation, Proof of Public
Records Kept or Stored on Electronic Computing Equipment, 71 A.L.R. 3d 232 (1976).
197. FED. R. EVID. 803(10).
198. United States v. Farris, 517 F.2d 226 (7th Cir. 1975).
199. Id. at 228; see also United States v. Neff, 615 F.2d 1235, 1241-42 (9th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 447 U.S. 925 (1980) (search of IRS computer records showed failure to file tax return);
United States v. Orozco, 590 F.2d 789 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 920 (1979); United States
v. Lanier, 578 F.2d 1246, 1254-55 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 856 (1978) (Federal Reserve
Bank computer records used against vendor of food stamps).
200. United States v. Orozco, 590 F.2d 789 (9th Cir. 1979).
201. Id. at 794.
202. United States v. Cepeda Penes, 577 F.2d 754 (Ist Cir. 1978).
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input procedures and recommended that proponents give advance notice of
their intent to use computer-generated evidence. 20 3
Those who argue for stricter foundational requirements for computer
printouts argue against self-authentication of certified computer-generated
public records because their accuracy and reliability depend on the accu-
racy and reliability of the system that created them.2° One commentator
takes the position that computer-generated public records should meet the
foundation requirements for business records as well as the authentication
requirements of a modified Rule 901.205
Those who argue for self-authentication under Rule 902(4) point out
that this rule explicitly includes "data compilations" and that there is no
basis for assuming computers increase errors or make errors harder to de-
tect in public records. 2"
V. ANALYSIS
As noted by commentators and courts, a computer printout may con-
tain false information. Yet, so may a record created with a pencil and pa-
per. Creating a record with a computer simply adds factors that may
contribute to errors. Today, attorneys, judges, and juries have adequate
experience with computers and their output to be aware of the limits of
computer reliability and accuracy.207 This experience eliminates not only
the false indicia of infallibility computer printouts might once have carried,
but also the need for all participants in a trial to become computer
experts.208
Although the legal system does not need new rules of evidence to deal
with printouts, blessing printouts with a presumption of reliability is not
justified. The information systems that business and government depend on
are sufficiently diverse that the factors which influence the accuracy, relia-
bility, and trustworthiness of a printout should be placed before the jury.
To help attain that objective, standards should be developed to deal with
printouts. These standards should require: (1) pre-trial notice of the intent
to use computer printouts, 20 9 (2) discovery concerning the reliability and
accuracy of computer printouts and the system that produced them,210 (3)
203. Id at 760-61.
204. See Singer, supra note 2, at 170.
205. Id at 170-74.
206. E.g., Comment, Presumption of Reliability, supra note 2, at 138-39.
207. See supra notes 60-61, 104 and accompanying text.
208. Id
209. See supra note 106.
210. See supra notes 112-14.
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authentication under Rule 901(b)(9) for all types of printouts, except certi-
fied public records,21' and (4) the additional Rule 803(6) and 803(8) foun-
dations for printouts of business and public records.212
Adequate pre-trial notice and discovery will decrease the admission of
false or misleading evidence, increase the efficiency of trials, provide a fairer
means to deal with evidentiary burdens, and assist the trier of fact in assess-
ing whether the printout contains what its proponent asserts. Furthermore,
notice and discovery will create more efficient trials because the opponent
can explore, by expert if necessary, the details and nuances of such proof
before, rather than at trial. Discovery will also provide opposing counsel
with more evidence to put before the fact-finder to use in assessing the
printout.213
Proponents should authenticate printouts, except those of certified pub-
lic records, under Rule 901(b)(9). Authentication under Rule 901(b)(9) is
needed because the reliability and accuracy of computer-generated evidence
depend upon the system which produces it.214 Such authentication need
not be extensive, however. The information provided by the suggested pre-
trial notice and discovery should meet Rule 901(b)(9)'s requirements in
most cases. As long as the court finds that a reasonable jury could find, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the printout is what its proponent
claims, any lack of proof should affect the weight given the evidence, not its
admissibility.215
Authentication under Rule 901(b)(9) will produce fair and just results.
Requiring the proponent to authenticate printouts treats the parties fairly
because the proponent has access to information about the system and its
programs. This requirement of authentication also comports with the treat-
ment of other types of evidence.
It is not necessary, or pragmatic, however, to require expert proof of
reliability and accuracy. 216 Lay awareness of the limits of computer relia-
bility eliminates the necessity of expert authentication.21 7 In addition, find-
ing experts for multiple vendors' software and hardware may be
prohibitively expensive, or impossible. Even so, expert authentication testi-
mony may benefit a proponent. If a party produces strong testimony relat-
ing to the reliability of a system and the accuracy of its result, the printout
211. See supra notes 118-122.
212. Id.
213. See generally supra notes 104-06, 110-17 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 118-22.
215. See supra notes 104-06, 110-17 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 116-17, 142-44 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
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will have more probative force. If the proponent fails to lay a strong au-
thenticating foundation, the opponent will have information, as the result of
discovery, to put before the jury that will decrease the probative force of the
printout.
In addition to authenticating the printout under Rule 901(b)(9), propo-
nents of records of regularly conducted activity should be required to lay
the separate Rule 803(6) foundation.218 The traditional foundation re-
quired for business records should suffice.2 19 The policies behind Rule
803(6) apply equally to computer-generated business records and manually-
documented records. Extensive business and governmental reliance on
computer systems provides circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.
Pre-trial notice and discovery will give the opponent of such evidence a fair
chance to discover if the computer-generated evidence is indeed
trustworthy.
The policy justifying self-authentication of traditional certified public
records applies equally to computer-generated certified public records.220
Therefore, proponents can authenticate computer-generated certified public
records under Rule 902(4). Because the reliability and accuracy of a com-
puter-generated certified public record depend, in part, on the reliability
and accuracy of the system that produced it, doubt may be cast on a com-
puter-generated certified public records's trustworthiness.2 21 Pre-trial dis-
covery will provide the opponent of such evidence with information
regarding the system's reliability and accuracy of result that the opponent
can use to object to a computer-generated certified public record's authen-
ticity under Rule 902(4), or trustworthiness under Rule 803(8).
VI. CONCLUSION
Courts do not need new rules of evidence, stricter foundations, or pre-
sumptions of reliability to deal adequately with computer printouts. The
Federal Rules of Evidence are sufficient safeguards of the reliability of com-
puter-generated evidence. Authenticating printouts under Rule 901(b)(9)
and requiring the additional Rule 803(6) and Rule 803(8) foundations will
give the trier of fact adequate evidence to judge a printout's reliability, accu-
218. See generally supra notes 118-22 and accompanying text.
219. See generally supra notes 150-57 and accompanying text.
220. See generally supra notes 194-205 and accompanying text.
221. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
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racy, and trustworthiness. Any doubts the trier of fact has should affect the
weight given the evidence, not its admissibility.222
MARK A. JOHNSON
222. See supra notes 103-06, 111-17 and accompanying text.
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